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SUMMARY
Flying internationally is an integral part of people’s everyday lives. Most United States
airlines fly internationally on a daily basis. The world continues to become a more dan-
gerous place, due to improvements to technology and the willingness of some nations to
sell older technology to rebel groups. In the military realm, there have been countermea-
sures to combat surface to air threats and thus increase the survivability of military aircraft.
Survivability is defined as the ability to remain mission capable after a single engagement.
Existing commercial aircraft currently do not have any countermeasure systems or missile
warning systems integrated into their onboard systems. Better understanding of the inter-
action between countermeasure systems and commercial aircraft will help bring additional
knowledge to support a cost benefit analysis. The scope of this research is to perform a
cost benefit analysis on the addition of these technologies that are currently available on
military aircraft, and to study the adding of these same technologies to commercial air-
craft. The research will include a cost benefit analysis along with a size, weight, and power
analysis. Additionally, a simulation will be included that will analyze the success rates of
different countermeasures versus different surface to air threats in hopes of bridging the
gap between a cost benefit analysis and a survivability simulation. The research will ex-
plore whether or not adding countermeasure systems to commercial aircraft is technically




Over two million passengers fly domestically and internationally everyday [1]. Further-
more, international flights have increasingly become more dangerous, due to terrorist groups
having access to surface to air missiles (SAMs) [23, 38, 2]. This research is about perform-
ing a cost benefit analysis on adding countermeasures to commercial aircraft to increase its
survivability against surface to air threats. Survivability is defined as: the ability to remain
mission capable after a single engagement [12].
1.1 Motivation
Currently, the types of threats used against commercial aircraft consist of surface to air
missiles and man portable air defense systems (MANPADS)[3]. MANPADS are generally
employed during take-offs and landings due to their limited range. While an aircraft is in
cruise phase, a surface-to-air missile is more than likely to be used to try to shoot down a
commercial aircraft. During the cruise phase of the flight profile, the parameters of an older
surface to air missile will be used to model the survivability, because of the availability of
older SAM missiles to rebel groups [23].
The motivation behind the topic stems from the increasing danger commercial aircraft face
every time an international flight is attempted. There are over four million square miles of
possible conflict zones and there have been over twenty-one malicious acts toward commer-
cial airplanes since 1970. Hundreds of commercial planes fly over conflict zones every day.
After the Malaysia airlines flight MH 17 was shot down in 2014, the U.S. made changes to
flight plans for commercial aircraft. The regions of eastern Ukraine, Crimea, North Korea,
northern Ethiopia, Libya, and Somalia are currently off limits to U.S aircraft. When travel-
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ing over the Middle East, U.S airlines must fly at a minimum altitude of 20,000 feet. That
is out of range for most, but as MH17 proved, not all missiles [23].
1.1.1 Past Events
In addition to the previously discussed flight, a Korean Air flight was shot down by the
USSR on September 1st, 1983. There was also a Boeing 747 commercial aircraft from
New York to Seoul that was shot down by a Soviet military aircraft just west of the Russian
island of Sakhalin, killing all 269 passengers and crew, including U.S. congressman Larry
McDonald [23].
On November 6th, 1987 an Air Malawi passenger flight was shot down en route to Li-
longwe from Blantyre. It crashed near the town of Ulongwe, killing eight passengers and
two crew members [36]. On patrol in the Persian Gulf on July 3rd, 1988, the USS Vin-
cennes shot down an Iranian commercial aircraft that had been mistaken for a hostile Ira-
nian military aircraft, which killed all 290 passengers aboard the commercial aircraft [37].
There have been similar attacks such as when the Ukrainian military shot down a Russian
commercial jet containing 78 passengers on October 4th, 2001, over the Black Sea travel-
ing from Tel Aviv in Israel to Novosibirsk, Russia. Russian crash investigators concluded
the Tu-154 was hit by a Ukrainian surface to air missile [36].
1.2 Threats
There are many possible threats that are capable and readily available that can destroy a
commercial aircraft in flight. These potential threats include: surface to air missiles, air to
air missiles, and directed energy weapons. The most popular type of threat used is the man
portable air defense system (MANPADS) which is a type of surface to air missile [12].
These are the most popular, because they are relatively the easiest to obtain due to their low
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cost and transportability. MANPADS are mainly used for attacking commercial aircraft
during their take-off and landing. For the scope of this thesis the surface to air threat that
will be studied is the long range surface to air missile, because the range of the MANPAD
is limited to takeoff and landing. One could make the argument that the guardian developed
by Northrup Grumman has solved the MANPAD threat to commercial aircraft during take
off and landings, leaving cruise phase as the only phase that could be attacked by a radar
guided surface to air threat.
1.2.1 Potential Threats
An example of potential MANPAD threat is the SA-7 GRAIL. The SA-7 GRAIL is equipped
with an explosive warhead and IR missile guidance system. The system also comes equipped
with RF headphones which can be used to determine the general location of an aircraft [37].
The SA-7 was first in 1968, but quickly upgraded to SA-7b. The SA-7 MANPADS has a
slant range of 1.4 km and a speed of Mach 1.4 [38], which is on the slower side when
compared to todays surface to air threats. An example of a long range surface to air missile
the SA-2 guideline which was developed in the 1960s during the cold war. Surface to air
missiles at this time were beginning to be equipped with proximity fuses and command
fusing capabilities. The SA-2 guideline is best known for downing a U-2 spy plane [38].
1.2.2 Access to Threats
According to Chow et al. over 700,000 MANPADS have been produced worldwide since
the 1970s.The Middle East has since become the world’s battleground giving way to cause
and effect that has provided terrorist groups MANPADS from countries all over the world
including the United States. Russian made MANPADS have been sold for as little as $5,000
in the Middle East and Central Asian countries. As of late terrorist groups have been willing
to collaborate to reach its goals. Due to this collaboration MANPADS now have the ability
to be transported anywhere in the world.
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1.3 Countermeasures
The military currently has many methods and measures to defend itself from surface to air
missile threats. The three countermeasures this thesis will focus on will be chaff, flares,
and directed energy.
1.3.1 Missile Warning System
The Northrup Grumman AN/AAR-54(V) is a missile warning system capable of tracking
and classifying multiple sources. The missile warning system utilizes the UV energy from
surface to air threats to classify the threat as lethal or non lethal. The system is designed
for wide-body aircraft, helicopters, and combat vehicles. The missile warning is currently
used by U.S special operations and the system is currently equipped to Air Force One [3].
1.3.2 Chaff/Flare Dispenser System
The ALE-47 Countermeasure Dispenser System is an integrated computer controlled sys-
tem, designed to employ electronic and infrared countermeasures [4]. The CMDS provides
the aircraft with protection from air-to-air and surface-to-air heat-seeking missiles. The
CMDS may be programmed to generate an optimum response to combat a single or multi-
ple threat environment [4].
1.3.3 Chaff
Chaff was first developed in the early stages of the second world war. The two major types
of military chaff in use are aluminum foil and aluminum-coated glass fibers. Chaff is a
defensive mechanism employed from military aircraft to avoid detection by adversary air
defense systems [5]. Chaff consists of small fibers that reflect radar signals and, when
dispensed in large quantities from an aircraft, it forms a cloud that temporarily hides the
aircraft from radar detection [4, 5, 6].
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1.3.4 Flares
Since the emergence of aircraft in the twentieth century, the control of airspace has be-
come of major tactical importance in times of conflict [7]. This has led to the creation
of anti-aircraft weapon systems that can be deployed from a variety of platforms. The in-
frared countermeasure (IRCM) flare has been developed to decoy heat seeking missiles [7].
Flares along with chaff is a countermeasure with goal of being a decoy and being a dis-
traction for a surface to air threat. The main differences between chaff and flares are chaff
are for radar guided SAMs and flares are for IR guided SAMs. Flares are high-temperature
heat sources ejected from aircraft that confuse the IR sensors on the incoming missile.
Once a flare is activated the IR signature is much greater than the aircrafts due to increased
burn temperature causing the IR guidance system to become confused. [7].
1.3.5 Directed Energy
In recent years the military has started to integrate directed energy counter measures on to
some of its of aircraft. There are several countermeasure systems with the goal of misdi-
recting the IR guidance system with a high energy laser. These technologies are usually
integrated onto the fuselage and tail of the aircraft. For example Northrup Grumman’s
Guardian is retrofitted the the fuselage of aircraft [9].
1.3.6 Towed Decoys
The AN/ALE-55 Fiber Optic Towed Decoy (FOTD) is manufactured by BAE SYSTEMS
and it is a radio frequency countermeasures system. IDECM incorporates receivers and
countermeasures that include the high-powered FOTD and deployment canister. The towed
decoy is going to provide electronic warfare defense for current and future RF surface to
air threats for military aircraft [10].
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1.3.7 Air Force One
The President of the United States must be ready to travel anywhere in the world on a
moment’s notice. Air Force one is currently a custom Boeing 747-200B. A commercial
Boeing 747-200B can hold a maximum of 480 passengers [13]. Air Force One is relevant
to this research because this type of Boeing aircraft is very common in commercial interna-
tional flights. Air Force one is outfitted with some of the world’s best defense technologies
including antennas, radar, and a plethora of infrared countermeasures that disrupt missile
guidance systems [13].
Specifically, Air Force One is outfitted with an AN/AAR-54(V)which is a missile warn-
ing system located at the tail of the aircraft [13]. Also, Air Force one is equipped with
directional IR countermeasure system which can be controlled and optimized by the AAR-
54 missile warning system, which fires flashes of IR energy to misdirect the incoming IR
missile [13].
Air Force One is the most efficient way the President of the United States travels. Air
Force One is one of the most protected vehicles in the United States by way of counter-
measure technologies. The information provided by Air Force One is a way one can show
the importance of these countermeasures and always displaying that these commercial air-
craft can be retrofitted with these technologies. The current plane used for Air Force One
is a Boeing 747. The Boeing 747 is a very popular commercial aircraft that is used glob-
ally. One can assume that all commercial aircraft can’t become Air Force One, but one can
assume that taking some of the countermeasure systems being used on Air Force One and
applying them to commercial wide-body aircraft would increase their survivability against
surface to air threats. To retrofit technologies similar to these, one could assume it would
incur some cost. Chow et al. created a detailed cost model for retrofitting a similar coun-
termeasure technology a commercial aircraft.
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1.4 Research Objective
The scope of this thesis will pertain to the cost of adding countermeasures to the commer-
cial aircraft, operation and support costs (O&S), and maintenance costs. This research will
include a cost benefit analysis along with a size, weight, and power analysis. A model and
simulation will be implemented to study the success rates of different countermeasures ver-
sus different surface to air threats. The research objective of this thesis is to perform a cost
benefit analysis for a given countermeasure technology and to quantify the effectiveness of
the countermeasure through a survivability model. The survivability model will focus on
the cruise phase of the flight profile. This thesis will focus on chaff as a countermeasure.
1.4.1 Challenges
The purpose behind the development of these technologies was to help defend military
aircraft of all types for the countermeasures mentioned in this research, specifically wide
body aircraft. Countermeasure technologies are becoming more popular in the commercial
cargo transport space. There is a lack of historical data of countermeasure technologies
being retrofitted to commercial aircraft, this absence does not allow one to use real system
measurements to validate the survivability model.
1.4.2 Research Approach
The approach for achieving this research objective is finding the correlation between the
cost benefit analysis of these technologies and to quantify the effectiveness of the given






A commercial airliner potentially being shot down is something no one would like to think
about, but it has happened, and there is always the likelihood of its happening again. There
have been papers written that have estimated the potential losses that go along with the
shooting down of a commercial airliner, such as airport closures.
According to Chow et al., if there was a commercial aircraft that was to be shot down
by a surface to air missile in the United States the cost of the plane and lives would result
in a loss of approximately $1 B. The loss of the aircraft would approximately cost $200 -
250 M depending on the model and also be able to transport 300 or more passengers. They
estimate the value per life would approximately be $2 M [38].
According to Chow et al. the loss of a commercial aircraft stems beyond just the immediate
loss of life and property. Another loss is the potential change in the gross domestic product
(GDP) that may result from the airline shut down itself. The airline industry sustains many
associated industries, slowdowns in the airline industry would have a negative cause and
effect on the associated industries.
Even though airline operations would eventually restart following a shutdown. A large
amount of the population would be uncomfortable with the idea of flying. Six months after
September 11th attack the airline industry was experiencing wide sweeping layoffs affect-
ing the industry from top to bottom. A year after September 11th the airline industry was
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still down roughly 8%. To avoid this problem at the time Chow et al. estimated the country
would be willing to pay $12 B to avoid an incident that effected traveler confidence [40].
2.1.1 Potential Solutions
Chow et al. provided insight on some possible solutions to prevent the shooting down
of a commercial aircraft. Solutions consisting of adding technologies to aircraft and also
some changes to policies currently set in place. According to Chow et al. there isn’t a
countermeasure that currently exists that would bring the could bring the probability of a
successful MANPADS attack on a commercial airliner to zero. Countermeasures in the
military space have been extremely valuable. The idea of adding countermeasure technolo-
gies to commercial aircraft is less obvious, because the probability of an attempt to shoot
down a United States commercial aircraft is extremely low.
To protect commercial aircraft from a MANPADS attack would take a multi-layered so-
lution. This multi-layered solution would have the goal of decreasing the attacker’s confi-
dence of using a MANPADS [40]. Chow et al. believes that confronting the enemy would
not only thwart MANPADS attacks, but threaten the terrorist network as a whole.
If that method does not work well enough Chow et al. provided four more methods in
MANPAD attack prevention. The four methods consist of preventing MANPADS from
being fired, preventing a launched missile from hitting the aircraft, minimizing the damage
from a missile hit, and minimizing the consequences from an attack.
Along with Chet at al. Bolkcom and Elias provided insight regarding a variation in air-
port security to prevent a successful MANPADS attack, airport security could enforce a
perimeter with a range larger than MANPADS being used in the attack. Current airport
security is not capable of completing such a task, which would require other efforts being
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made to help thwart the attack, such public education, neighborhood watch programs, se-
curity patrols in high risk areas. However, this could be the starting point in a multi-layered
solution .
Bolkom and Elias have provided insight on possible solutions regarding improved pilot
training and air traffic procedures. Airline pilots currently receive simulator training on
handling loss of power to an engine during takeoffs and landings. The training they believe
aircraft crews should receive should prepare crews to handle the loss of power due to a
missile strike. Modern aircraft are designed with avionics and flight control systems, that
if a missile strike does not destroy the aircraft it would like be able to survive if the flight
crew is trained properly.
Bolkom and Elias provide techniques to mitigate the chances of a successful attack, but
without a missile warning system, it is highly improbable the pilot would be made aware of
a missile launch. Large cargo planes are generally not nimble aircraft making maneuver-
ability less effective. Bolkom and Elias believe reducing the aircraft’s heat signature and
auxiliary power units when applicable may reduce the effectiveness of the MANPADS IR
guidance system. The safety risk associated with reducing the aircraft’s heat signature will
need to be carefully analyzed before these methods are implemented.
Bolkom and Elias theorized that altering aircraft routes to decrease the amount of time
the aircraft is vulnerable to a missile launch could be a viable mitigation technique. If one
could change the approach routes and departing routes of the aircraft, it could decrease
the chances of a successful MANPADS attack, because there would be less predictability
in the routes. Currently, commercial aircraft rely on gradual descents along known ap-
proach routes. Departing aircraft with heavy cargo loads can be targeted up to 30 miles
away before they eventually are out of the effective range of a MANPADS. One challenge
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to implementing this technique is that commercial aircraft radio frequencies are not pro-
tected, and terrorists may be able gather intelligence regarding the change in aircraft routes.
If the layer attempting to prevent a missile launch fails, countermeasures might prevent
the missile from making a successful hit. Each system has its own pros and cons. Some
systems could provide highly effective protection under a wide range of conditions, but
none are able to protect against the full range of threats. The three countermeasure sys-
tems Chow et al. considered adding to commercial aircraft are flares, laser jammers, and
high-energy lasers.
2.2 Cost Benefit Analysis
According to Watkins, a cost benefit analysis (CBA) has its origins in the water develop-
ment projects of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The Corps of Engineers had its origins
in the French engineers hired by George Washington in the American Revolution [15]. Cost
benefit analysis do have some limitations specifically in efforts that involve small to mid-
level capital expenditures with fast approaching deadlines. A cost benefit analysis may be
sufficient enough to make a well informed decision. Large projects with lengthy deadlines,
some CBAs fail to take into account inflation, interest rates, changes in cash flow, and the
present value dollar amount [15].
2.3 Costs
The costs that come along with adding countermeasures to commercial vehicles can be
quite expensive. The Chow et al. research breaks down its costs into two sub groups:
installation costs, and operation and support (OS) costs, which stem from total life-cycle
cost (LCC). They conclude their cost benefit analysis by considering total program costs in
the context of the federal TSA budget.
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2.3.1 Installation Costs
Chow et al. made cost estimates for installing the most promising near-term countermea-
sure systems. All of the values and figures are based on the 2003 fiscal year (FY) and
approximately 6,800 U.S. commercial aircraft. Those costs were based on modifying the
most current set of cost data values from wide-body military IR countermeasure systems.
Specifically Chow et al. adjusted weights and volumes calculated for the military version
to meet the form and fit required to enclose all the electronics within the pod installed on
the underside of the fuselage of the commercial aircraft. The direct energy countermeasure
systems for commercial aircraft will consist of:
• Missile warning system of four two-color missile warning infrared sensors capable
of detecting MANPADS
• System processor designed to military specifications using fifth-generation CPUs
• Electronic control unit
• Multi-band laser transmitter mounted within a small turret
• Command, control, and communications system to provide missile warning updates
and intercept data to ground control operations
• Built-in-test hardware and software subsystem
• The canoe-type surface mounting hardware package and other A-kit interface hard-
ware to enclose the preceding system components
Chow et al. estimated a total fleet installation cost of $11.2 B. That includes:
• Research, development, test, and evaluation (RDTE) phase at $445 M, consisting of
the systems design, aircraft flight testing, and FAA certification for six fully config-
ured prototype systems
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• Manufacturing technology, capital, and facilities cost at $165 M to build up the an-
nual production rate needed through the end of low-rate initial production $65 M,
and the set-up tooling of a second final assembly and test manufacturing line for the
entire production $100 million
• Purchase of initial spares and test bench equipment at $900 M
• Procurement and retrofit of approximately 6,800 directed energy B-kits and A-kits at
$9.75 B
Chow et al. assumed the development phase of a commercial DIRCM system beginning
in FY 2004 and continuing until the end of FY 2007. The development estimate assumed
the six flight-test prototypes that would be adequate for integrating across the most popular
commercial aircraft models. In addition, the estimate included a sufficient number of pro-
totype ground and flight tests to perform analysis on the acoustic and vibration effects on
the system.
Finally, the total RDTE estimate includes an adequate number of reliability and main-
tainability demonstrations within commercially acceptable threshold and objective values.
To prepare for these costs, Chow et al. estimated the commercial direct energy counter-
measure system development cost by increasing the large aircraft infrared countermeasure
RDTE total budget by 60%. That factor was based on the following considerations:
• Extent of repackaging of the B-kits to fit within the canoe structure
• Number of unique A-kit designs need for each commercial aircraft model
• Number of flight tests required for installing, testing, and certifying the systems on
all the commercial aircraft models
Chow et al. projected procurement to begin in FY 2006 during the third year of the system
development phase and continuing through FY 2009. By then, approximately 1,100 com-
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mercial aircraft would be fitted with the new countermeasure technology, which would be
enough to cover all three stages of the reserve commercial fleet, as well as all wide-body
aircraft for international and domestic flights. The average unit production cost was esti-
mated to be $1.3 M (in FY 2003 dollars). This cumulative average unit production cost is
the sum of the unit cost of the following:
• Airborn directed energy countermeasure system A-kit, B-kit, and system installation
cost
• The cost of the initial spares, technical data, support equipment, and change orders,
amortized on per-system basis by applying a 92 percent cost improvement curve or
learning curve slope across the total quantity of approximately 6,800 systems.
2.3.2 Operation & Support Costs
Chow et al. estimated the annual O&S cost per aircraft of $300,000 for a subtotal O&S
cost of $27 B through FY 2023. Those costs considered the following:
• Added fuel cost of $45,000 needed due to the drag and additional weight that the
commercial aircraft will be carrying over an assumed 3,000 hours per year
• Maintenance cost of $140,000 per aircraft per year
• Airline mechanics labor, spares, and other material needed to perform airport ground
maintenance
• Airline depot level or contractor logistics support activities for scheduled system
overhauls and repairs
• Technology upgrade and sustainment cost of $60,000 per aircraft per year
• Airplane delays $15,000 per aircraft per year
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The added fuel cost estimate stems from an increased drag estimate of 0.4% and added
system-level total weight of approximately 500 lbs. The total O&S cost is thus $27 B.
Once all systems are installed, annual O&S costs would amount to a little over $300,000
per airplane, or $2.1 billion for a 6,800-plane fleet.
2.3.3 Benefit Analysis
Chow et al. performed their final piece of the cost benefit analysis by comparing the cost of
adding technologies to commercial aircraft to the overall budget of the TSA. The OS costs
amass about half of the TSA budget of $4.4 B. Chow et al. provided the recommenda-
tion of postponing the adding of countermeasure technologies to commercial aircraft, due
to the uncertainties in the cost of the countermeasures and their effectiveness in reducing
the overall aircraft vulnerability. They claimed the current RDTE activities are the most
important step toward both reducing significant cost uncertainties involved and minimizing
the delay of the program.
The cost benefit analysis by Chow et al. acknowledges many threats to commercial air-
craft and the possible solutions. One of the solutions mentioned by Chow et al. is a viable
solution which, entails adding countermeasures to a commercial wide body aircraft. Chow
et al. concludes that the countermeasures alone won’t be effective enough. They state a
multilayered approach would be necessary to actually thwart surface to air missile attempts
on commercial aircraft.
2.4 Space Filling Designs for Computer Experiments
Professor Jeff Wu suggests that if one observes a response and wishes to study how that
response varies as one changes the input variables. One must determine if the response
may be affected by outside factors. Unless one can control the effects of the outside factors,
observations at the same values will vary as the outside factors vary [19].
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2.4.1 Latin Hypercube Sampling
The Latin Hypercube Design spreads the points evenly over the design space based upon
the value of each input variable. The LH could sample point distributed evenly along the
diagonal of the design space. It is true the points along the diagonal have projections that
are evenly spread out over the input values. One could not assume the points to be evenly
spread throughout the entire design space [19].
2.5 Model Validation
Jane Hillston concludes based up on the the performance analysis extracted from a model,
it will only have some bearing on the real system being represented. Validation is the task
of demonstrating that the model is a reasonable representation of the actual system. A
model is usually developed to analyze a particular problem and may therefore represent
different parts of the system at different levels of abstraction. As a result, the model may
have different levels of validity for different parts of the system, due to the fidelity of part
being studied [20].
Three key factors which should be considered during model validation:
• Assumptions
• Input parameter values and distributions
• Output values and conclusions
However, in practice it may be difficult to achieve such a full validation of the model, espe-
cially if the system being modeled does not yet exist. In general, initial validation attempts
will concentrate on the output of the model, and only if that validation suggests a problem
will more detailed validation be undertaken [20].
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There are three approaches one could apply to perform model validation and any com-
bination of them may be applied [20]. These approaches are:
• Expert intuition
• Real system measurements
• Theoretical results/analysis
Any time a research engineer creates a model/simulation one must also verify and validate
their logic and procedures. For model validation expert intuition and real system measure-
ments will be the approaches guiding the validation process. Throughout the data analysis
process the results will be used as validation.
2.6 Literature Review Summary
There are several reasons why the information above is important. Recognizing the threat
to commercial wide body aircraft that fly over conflict zones on a daily basis. In these
conflict zones there are terrorist groups that have access to older surface to air missiles.
Several studies have shown that there is an underlying willingness for terrorist groups to
these military capable threats against commercial aircraft.
After a review of the literature one could recognize a gap between quantifying the ef-
fectiveness of these countermeasures and their costs. This thesis addresses this gap with
its own cost benefit analysis similar to the one in the literature, but also provides a surviv-
ability model that assesses the technology’s effectiveness against surface to air threats. The
simulation model will use Latin Hypercube Sampling, because it is an extremely efficient
way for random sampling the interior of design spaces. LHS does have some weaknesses,




Figure 3.1: Steps in Methodology
3.1 Challenges
Lack of Historical Data
Major issues stem from the lack of historical data regarding adding these types of tech-
nologies to commercial aircraft, such as the lack of real system measurements. The lack
of size, weight, and power analysis regarding the effects of adding these technologies to
commercial aircraft such as the physical effects on the commercial aircraft. Fortunately, all
of these technologies are at a technology readiness level (TRL) of 9 meaning the system is
flight proven through successful mission operations, according NASA’s TRL chart. Chaff,
flares, directed energy, and towed decoys are commonly used in the defense sector today.
Physical and Virtual Testing
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In order to select between different technologies for any given mission scenario requires,
in essence, the ability to either physically test or virtually analyze them in a simulation en-
vironment. Adding technologies to a commercial vehicle and then physically testing those
technologies is extremely expensive, leaving modeling and simulation as the only viable
option.
3.2 Performance Prediction
Chaff has been in use since World War II and is currently equipped to wide body military
transport aircraft, such as the C-17 and C-130. One can assume the chaff countermeasure
technology performs well enough to keep equipping it to modern military transport aircraft.
The chaff countermeasure has operational results that would appear more favorable, than
a commercial aircraft without any surface to air missile countermeasures. One must think
about the odds of a U.S airliner under attack from the ground; one can assume these odds
are extremely low. Another one being the effectiveness of the countermeasure not being
high enough to commit the amount of capital that is required to retrofit wide-body aircraft
with these technologies.
3.3 Observations
In summary, a gap is observed in the literature between the effectiveness of these counter-
measures and a cost analysis of these countermeasures. Chow et al.’s cost benefit analysis
of adding countermeasures to commercial aircraft is very thorough and one could use their
methodology as a basis for a similar methodology with slight changes in the fleet size,
due to focusing only on wide body aircraft. The scope of this thesis will only focus on
one countermeasure, and that will be chaff with a missile warning system developed by
Northrop Grumman.
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3.4 Research Questions and Hypothesis
Chow et al. performed a cost benefit analysis that evaluated 6,800 domestic U.S airlines.
Chow et al. and Bolkom provided a multi-layer system to attempt and thwart the attack of
a surface to air missile on a commercial aircraft.The same cost benefit analysis methodolo-
gyprovided by Chow et al. will provide an in depth analysis that is adequate to successfully
complete a cost benefit analysis on a smaller sample size of commercial aircraft.
Research Question 1:
How can one quantify the effectiveness of countermeasures deployed from commercial air-
liners against surface to air threats to capture the cost relationship for implementation of
such countermeasures?
Hypothesis 1:
If the researcher uses a survivability model to describe the effectiveness of each counter-
measure and a cost model to provide detailed cost analysis, then one could directly capture
the correlation between cost and survivability between countermeasures.
Research Question 2:
By quantifying the effects of the countermeasure on a commercial aircraft using a SWAP
analysis one could determine if the cost of implementation from both acquisition cost and
performance decrements are justified. Further, how can one determine if adding counter-
measures to commercial aircraft or simply avoiding conflict zones altogether is more cost
effective over the lifespan of the vehicle?
Hypothesis 2:
If the rate of survivability is not high enough to justify the cost of adding these technologies
to a commercial aircraft; avoiding conflict zones altogether will likely assert itself as the
more viable alternative.
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3.5 Task One: Cost Benefit Analysis
The cost benefit analysis that will be performed will encompass adding countermeasure
systems to the commercial aircraft. Where my cost benefit analysis slightly differs is Chow
et al. added countermeasure systems to all of the United States commercial aircraft fleet.
The CBA that will be performed here will only simulate the adding of countermeasure
systems to planes that typically make international flights, which will greatly reduce the
overall costs of instillation and OS costs. The seven steps the researcher decided to go with
to complete the CBA are:
1. Define the unit of cost. It is important to establish what exactly your CBA measures
in terms of cost. The two types of cost my research will define will be time and
money.
2. Itemize the tangible costs of the intended project. The two tangible costs that the
researcher will consider will be installation cost and OS costs.
3. Itemize all intangible costs.
4. Itemize projected benefits; these are projected benefits that stem from adding coun-
termeasure systems to commercial aircraft. For example, an unsuccessful SAM at-
tack on a United States commercial aircraft, due to a countermeasure system. The
projected benefits are the increase in confidence of travelers, money saved from the
saving of lives and plane, and a possible increase in travelers who feared of a SAM
attack on a commercial aircraft.
5. Add up and compare the project’s cost and benefits. All of the installation costs and
OS costs will be tabulated, and then all of the ongoing costs will be subtracted from
the ongoing benefits determined in step 4.
6. Calculate a payback time for the venture. Unfortunately, for this venture to be worth
it there would have to be an attack on a United States commercial aircraft. On top of
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that, it is not guaranteed that the countermeasure system will always work against a
SAM.
7. Use the CBA to make an informed decision about whether to pursue the project.
After analyzing all of the information determined from the CBA, one would use the
information to determine if adding countermeasure systems to commercial aircraft is
technically feasible and financially viable.
3.6 Task Two: Size, Weight, and Power Analysis
When adding technologies to a commercial aircraft one of the most important things along
with cost, is the size, weight, and power of the technology. All of these things play a
critical role in aircraft performance. The size of the technology can effect the aircraft in
different ways depending on placement inside or outside of the aircraft. Size defined as a
thing’s overall dimensions or magnitude. If the technology is placed on the inside of the
aircraft fuselage, it can reduce storage. If placed on the outside of the aircraft it can have
a huge impact on aerodynamics. Negatively affecting aerodynamics can dramatically in-
crease drag. Drag is the aerodynamic force that opposes an aircraft’s motion through the
air [21]. Increasing drag will decrease range and fuel efficiency ultimately costing time and
money.
The weight of technology will not have a huge effect on drag, but will affect the lift of
the aircraft. Weight is a body’s relative mass giving rise to a downward force due to grav-
ity. Lift is the force that directly opposes the weight of an airplane and holds the airplane
in the air [22]. Decreasing lift will affect your fuel efficiency and have a negative impact
on range. These technologies require some kind of power source for operation while the
aircraft is in flight.
Along with adding the technology to the airplane, one would need to also add a power
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source for the technology, contributing to weight. The SWAP analysis will consist of a
comparison between the size, weight, and power required to operate the technology. The
steps that will be taken to perform the SWAP analysis are:
1. Calculated size in comparison to the overall size of the plane
2. Calculated the forces of the system on the plane


















3.7 Task Three: Model Survivability
Due to the expense of physically testing these technologies on commercial vehicles, testing
their survivability through modeling and simulation is a less expensive option. Modeling
the survivability will be done through parametric modeling. Parametric modeling is creat-
ing a model from known facts about a population [24].
3.7.1 Simulation Design
The process of the development of the simulation environment consisted of the creation
of the motion model, the surface to air missile guidance system, and then combing both
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motion models into a simulation. Along with the motion models one must include the no-
tification method and maneuver capabilities and the aircraft and missile constraints. Then
one could perturb parameters for various case studies.
The simulation model will be object oriented in MATLAB and will contain four main
classes the motion model for the aircraft, motion model for the missile, and the onboard
radar and sensors. The sensor model for the missile simulates the perfect guidance sys-
tem. One can assume the probability of success would increase as the sensor model fidelity
increases. The motion model for the aircraft contains the parameters, maneuvers, and con-
straints. simulation parameters consist of number of times to vary initial parameters, alti-
tude, initial position, type of aircraft, maneuver, missile location updates, direction, delay,
and intensity.
Table 3.1: Simulation Parameters
Simulation Parameters Description
n Number of times parameters are varied
Altitude Z coordinate of the aircraft
XaircraftInt X coordinate of the aircraft
YaircraftInt Y coordinate of the aircraft
Aircraft Boeing 777-300ER
Missile SA - 2
Maneuver Aircraft actions after missile launch
Update Aircraft’s missile awareness
Direction Aircraft’s starting direction
Delay Delay between updates of the missile’s position
Intensity How close to max load factor
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3.8 Code Architecture
Figure 3.2: Code Architecture
The initial state was set by the simulation parameters regarding the aircraft’s initial starting
position and altitude using a Latin Hypercube Design [19, 25]. The reasoning behind only
varying the starting position and not anything else such as cruise speed is because the cruise
speeds would be so relatively close to each other that the change in cruise speed compared
to the speed of the missile could be negligible.
The aircraft motion model was set by a wide-body aircraft that is very similar to a Boe-
ing 777-300ER, which can hold up to 550 seats, has a max cruise speed of 587 mph, and a
rate of climb of 3000 fpm [26]. The aircraft is constrained by the maximum number of G’s
and its cornering speed. The aircraft’s maneuvers are constrained by the flight maneuvering
envelope. The aircraft’s power constraints for climbing are the pitch requirements and pos-
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itive load factor, and the max rate of climb is constrained by the excess power. The physics
based constraints such as the max velocity and loading factor limitations are determined
from the V-n diagram.








Table 3.2: Aircraft Parameters
Aircraft Parameters Description
Cruise Speed Aircraft’s cruise speed
Climb Rate Aircraft’s rate of climb
Descend Rate Aircraft’s descend rate
Position Vector Aircraft’s initial position vector
Velocity Vector Aircraft’s initial velocity
Table 3.3: Boeing 777-300ER Properties
Aircraft Parameters Description
Max Speed Aircraft’s cruise speed
W/S Aircraft’s rate of climb
Thrust Loading Aircraft’s descend rate
Coefficient of Drag Aircraft’s initial position vector
Aspect Ratio Aircraft’s initial velocity
Span Efficiency Aircraft’s span efficiency WTO
Given the condition of a missile detection being true, the aircraft will begin its maneuver
based on the given input parameters by the user. The aircraft will have two options re-
garding maneuvers; the first option will consist of absolutely no maneuver with the aircraft
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Table 3.4: Boeing 777-300ER Constraints
Aircraft Parameters Description
Corner Speed Aircraft’s corner speed
Acceleration Aircraft’s acceleration
Max g Aircraft’s maximum amount of g forces
Min g Aircraft’s minimum amount of g forces
Pitch Constraints Aircraft’s pitch limits
just continuing on its charted course. The second option will consist of a turn to the right,
climbing, and increasing velocity. Along with the second maneuver option the aircraft will
release the chaff slightly before it starts its maneuver. The chaff will then create a radar
cross section large enough for the missile to then start approaching the chaff. Once the
missile reaches the chaff it will then turn its bearing toward the aircraft, because it will then
have the largest radar cross section.
Given the condition a missile is not detected the missile motion will take into effect. The
missile being used in the simulation is very similar to the SA - 2 Guideline. This missile is
constrained by its max speed, max g, mass, burn time, coefficient of drag, and drag polar.
The turning model is based on the maximum structural acceleration and corresponding de-
crease in velocity. The missile motion model consist of the missile’s position and velocity.
xnew(t) = x(t) + t ∗ v(t)
v(t) = v(t) ∗ (updatedbearing)
(3.4)
The simulation will have two options regarding the update of the missile’s location with
respect to the aircraft. The first option will be absolutely no alert of the missile launch
which will simulate the lack of a missile warning system currently on commercial aircraft.
The second option will simulate a missile warning system that will update the aircraft on
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Table 3.5: Missile Parameters
Missile Parameters Description
Max Speed Missile’s max speed
Max G’s Missile’s max sustainable G forces
Mass Missile’s mass
Burn Time How long missile is provided thrust Position Vector
Missile’s starting initial vector
Velocity Vector Missile’s starting initial vector
Cd Missile’s coefficient of drag
S Missile’s drag polar
the missile’s time of launch and provide continuous updates of the missile’s position. The
missile warning system will also provide continuous updates to the aircraft regarding the
missile’s position.
Lastly, if the check end condition is satisfied by the missile being less than ten meters
away from the aircraft or the velocity of the missile is less than mach one. If the given
conditions are not met the scenario results will produced and then one could perform data




For the results and discussion section this thesis will discuss the performed cost analysis
which included the installation cost and operation and support costs for a wide body air-
craft. Once the cost analysis is completed the researcher then performed a size, weight, and
power analysis to understand the forces applied to the plane, compare the systems to the
overall size of the plane, and calculate the cost of the power required. Then, the researcher
will discuss the results of the effectiveness of a countermeasure and the lack thereof. Fi-
nally, the researcher synthesizes the above information into a benefit analysis, which will
then lead to a recommendation based on the current state of the analysis. With the goal of
bridging the gap between the cost of these technologies and quantifying their effectiveness.
4.1 Cost Benefit Analysis
According to fi-areoweb the United States fleet of commercial aircraft consisted of 7,126
vehicles and of that 7,126, 15.09% of those aircraft were wide body types. Therefore, there
were 1,075 wide body aircraft in the United States fleet in 2016 [27]. The table below
shows the entire make up of the United States commercial fleet by body type.
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Table 4.1: U.S. Fleet 2016 — By Type
# Type # in Fleet % of fleet
1 Narrow-Body Jet 3,934 55.21%
2 Regional Jet 1,639 23.00%
3 Wide-Body Jet 1,075 15.09%
4 Turboprop 386 5.42%
5 Business Jet 69 0.97%
6 Piston 23 0.32%
Using the methodology for the cost benefit analysis performed by Chow et al. at the RAND
Corporation. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to
public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more
prosperous [28]. One could assume the practices of the RAND corporation are sufficient,
because of their reputation to produce acceptable results on a consistent basis.
4.1.1 Installation Cost
The cost estimates are for installing the AN/AAR 54(V) missile warning system developed
by Northrop Grumman that cost $290k [29] and six ALE-47 Chaff/Flare dispenser systems
developed by BAE systems that cost $30k [30] each during the fiscal year (FY) 2018, on
1,075 U.S commercial aircraft. These costs were based on modifying the most current set
of parametric data values from military systems.
The main assumption contributing to the cost benefit analysis is that these technologies can
be retrofitted on to commercial aircraft; this assumption is derived from countermeasure
technologies installed on Air Force One. One can estimate a total fleet installation cost of
$1.32 B. That includes the:
• Procurement of six ALE-47 Dispenser systems for 1,075 wide-body aircraft in the
30
Table 4.2: Installation Cost Estimate AN/AAR 54(V) ALE-47 FY 2018
Cost Name Cost amount $
Procurement (MWS & 6 units) $505,150,000
RDT&E $0




United States commercial fleet at $505.25 M
• Procurement of approximately 99 missile warning systems and approximately 600
ALE-47 spare dispenser systems at approximately $46.6M
• The value above may not reflect the exact value of retrofitting the ALE 47 dispenser
systems and a MWS, but from the literature one can assume it may cost on the order
of hundreds of thousands of dollars. Retrofitting approximately 1,075 wide-body
aircraft in the United States commercial fleet at $769.65 M
The two main differences between the current cost benefit analysis and the one performed
by Chow et al. regarding the installation cost is Chow et al. included for $445 M for
research, development, test, and evaluation. These activities consisted of the systems de-
sign, aircraft flight testing, and Federal Aviation Administration certification for six fully
configured prototype systems. Also, Chow et al. set aside $165 M for manufacturing
technologies, capital, facilities to build up the annual production rate needed through the
end of low-rate initial production, and set-up tooling of a second final assembly and test
manufacturing line for the entire full-rate production phase. The reason this current cost
benefit analysis doesn’t include those costs is because these technologies are off the shelf,
and in this case BAE Systems and Northrup Grumman would be responsible for those costs.
The cost of procurement was calculated by the given cost of $180,000 for six of the ALE
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47 dispenser systems added to the $290,000 for the Northrup Grumman missile warning
system, to give a total value of $470,000 per aircraft. Then multiplying it by 1,075, for the
total number of wide-body U.S aircraft in the United States fleet, provide a total value of
$505.25M.
The cost of the spares was calculated from the information given from the Chow et al.
cost benefit analysis; one could find the percentage of spares from the cost of the spares
divided by the total cost of the procurement. Then once could multiply that percentage by
the number of wide-body planes in the United States fleet to find the number of spares.
Chow et al. combined the cost of procurement and retrofitting their specified technology
into one cost. One could calculate the cost of retrofitting by subtracting the cost of procure-
ment from the total cost, which would determine the cost of retrofitting, which has a value
of $715,952. Multiplying that value by 1,075 yields the total value of approximately $770
M.
4.1.2 Operation & Support Cost
The cost estimates are derived from operating and supporting the AN/AAR 54(V) missile
warning system developed by Northrop Grumman and six ALE-47 Chaff/Flare dispenser
systems developed by BAE systems in the fiscal year (FY) 2018 of 1,075 U.S commercial
aircraft. These costs were based on modifying the most current set of of parametric data
values from military systems.
The differences between the current cost benefit analysis and the one completed by Chow et
al. is Chow et al. included technology upgrade sustainment costs that maintain the capabil-
ity of the countermeasures as different threats emerge, which does not account for dramatic
shifts in threat capability. Chow et al. also included cost growth/uncertainty of 25%. The
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Table 4.3: Operation and Support Cost Estimate AN/AAR 54(V) ALE-47 FY 2018
Cost Name Fleet Cost Amount$ Cost Amount Per Aircraft $
Maintenance $273,240,390 $254,177
Added Fuel $26,815,262 $24,944
Cost Growth $0 $0
Tech Upgrade and Sustainment $0 $0
Airplane Delays $21,956,821 $20,424
O&S (Ten Year Service) $268,356,875 $249,634
Maintenance (Ten Year Service) $273,240,3897 $2,541,771
Total $3,220,124,735
reason behind not including these costs are because the technologies being retrofitted are at
the top of their technology ”S” curve, and one could conclude that it would not be logical
to continue to invest in a technology when it is at the top of its ”S” curve.
The value of $29,944 for added fuel is needed due to the drag and additional weight that
the aircraft will be carrying over an assumed 3,000 hours per year. One could calculate
this value by using the values provided by the cost benefit analysis performed by Chow et
al.. Chow et al. stated that it would cost $45,000 per aircraft to carry an additional 500
lbs. Since the total weight of the missile warning system and ALE-47 dispenser system is
approximately 225 lbs., one could assume the cost for additional fuel would be about half
of what was stated in the original cost benefit analysis after moving the dollar amount to
today’s dollar value.
The maintenance cost of $254,177 per aircraft per year stems from the airline mechanics
labor and other material needed to do on-equipment airport ground maintenance. Airline
contractor logistics support activities for scheduled system overhauls and unscheduled re-
pairs of failed components sent back from the airport [38]. The maintenance cost was
driven by a mean-time-between-failure(MTBF) estimate of 600 hours, based on projected
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military system reliability. Chow et al. determined there would be a per aircraft mainte-
nance cost of $140,000 based on a mean-time-between-failure of 800 hours. After moving
the dollar amount to today’s value one could calculate the cost of maintenance based on the
MTBF. Chow et al. determined there were would be $15,000 in operations cost in airport
delays; moving that dollar amount to today’s value one would obtain the dollar amount
$20,425 in airport delays. Propagating the operation and support cost and maintenance
cost over a ten year period one would get the values of $487,720,838 and $2,732,403,897
respectively for a grand total of $3,220,124,735.
4.2 Size, Weight, and Power Analysis
The purpose of the SWAP analysis is to study the countermeasure’s physical effects on the
wide-body aircraft. The wide-body commercial aircraft will be equipped with six ALE-47
dispenser systems and one AN/AAR 54(V). The reasoning behind equipping the commer-
cial aircraft with six dispenser systems is because of the similarity in dimensions between
a wide-body military aircraft and a wide-body commercial aircraft, they have similar radar
cross sections, based on dimensions. Currently, C-130 aircraft are equipped with 12 ALE-
47 dispensers, six for flares, six for chaff [32].
The values in the table above are pulled from the Navy’s system training plan [6]. The total
volume of all six ALE-47 dispenser systems is approximately five feet, which is not that
large when you compare it to the size of the cargo hold capacity of a wide-body aircraft.
The size and weights of the dispenser system are not negligible, because for any given air-
craft there is a maximum take off weight.
The weight of the missile warning system developed by Northrop Grumman could not be
determined. The size and weight of a different missile warning system is included below
which was developed by BAE systems. The total weight of the six dispensers and one mis-
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Table 4.4: Size, Weight, and Power Analysis of ALE - 47 Dispenser System
EQUIPMENT LENGTH(IN) WIDTH(IN) HEIGHT(IN) WEIGHT(LBS) VOL(FT3)
Progammer 5.75 3.75 6.14 4.5 0.077
CDU 6.8 5.75 3.75 5.0 0.085
DCDU 4.22 5.675 3.00 2.3 0.042
Sequencer 6.53 6.57 2.89 3.75 0.072
Digital Sequencer Switch 6.00 4.00 1.80 1.5 0.025
Dispenser (D-56 or D-63) 9.83 10.13 7.77 4.00 0.448
Magazine (MX-11599) 6
Safety Switch 4.61 3.64 2.55 2 0.025
Total 1 System 43.74 39.52 20.13 29.05 0.772
Total 6 Systems 262.44 237.09 120.78 174.3 4.634
sile warning system is approximately 225 lbs. The weight of the average human is 137 lbs;
one can perform a tradeoff between losing two passengers, or if the airline company wants
to keep its maximum amount of seats on board one can assume the weight would come
from the fuel weight. The Boeing 777-300ER has a maximum range of approximately
9,000 miles, with a maximum fuel capacity of 47,890 gallons [26]. A naive calculation
for mileage would therefore be approximately 0.188 mpg. There are aspects that are not
included such as load, altitude, and winds [33]. Using the values from the source above
the wide-body aircraft would lose approximately six miles based on the naive calculations
above. The values in the table below come from forecasts international [35].
Table 4.5: Size, Weight, and Power Analysis of a NOTIONAL missile warning system
EQUIPMENT LENGTH(IN) WIDTH(IN) HEIGHT(IN) WEIGHT(LBS) POWER(WATTS)



















To calculate the cost of the power consumption from the missile warning system above
one can use the mentioned the equations mentioned previously and based on the current
kilowatt-hour cost of 12 cents. The energy cost of a system that consumes 425 watts used
24 hours a day is $447 annually. One can also assume the system would only be used
for for a few hours at a time, decreasing the cost drastically. Again, the calculation above
assumes the system will be used for 24 hours a day to determine the cost of the absolute
worst case scenario.
4.3 Survivability Model
The researcher performed three case studies simulating the wide-body aircraft without any
countermeasure technologies and without performing a maneuver, the wide-body aircraft
with just missile warning system and a maneuver, and the wide-body aircraft with only a
missile warning system, countermeasure, and maneuver. The three case studies will use the
same aircraft and missile parameters. There will be a trade off study on the effectiveness
of the maneuver, missile warning system, and/or the countermeasure. The trade off study
will include varying the parameters alert time and the use of a countermeasure. The MAT-
LAB visual outputs consist of the initial position of the aircraft. The red dots indicate the
aircraft was impacted and the green dots indicate the aircraft avoided impact. The aircraft
and missile parameters above will be the parameters used for all three case studies.
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Table 4.6: Aircraft Parameters
Aircraft Parameters Description
Cruise Speed 250.3 m
s
Max Climb Rate 10.2 m
s
Max Descend Rate 10.2 m
s
Position Vector Generated by LH
Velocity Vector [250.3,0,0]
Table 4.7: Missile Parameters
Missile Parameters Description










4.3.1 Case Study # 1
Table 4.8: Simulation Parameters: No Alert and No Maneuver
Simulation Parameters
n 5000
Altitude Z coordinate of the aircraft
XaircraftInt Generated by LH
YaircraftInt Generated LH
Aircraft Boeing 777-300ER
Missile SA - 2




Alert Time Aircraft is not alerted
Intensity 1
For the first case study the researcher created a scenario that simulates a wide-body aircraft
attempting to be shot down by a surface to air missile. The aircraft is completely unaware
of the SAM site and is not alerted or updated about the missile’s location. The simulation
parameters are listed above.
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Figure 4.1: No Alert and No Maneuver Matlab Visual Output
The figure above is one of the outputs of the simulation and it describes the initial starting
position of the aircraft relative to the missile. The SAM started to make impact with the
aircraft that were located within 70km. The colors indicate if the aircraft was impacted or
avoided. Due to the aircraft having zero indication of the location of the missile, the missile
had an extremely high success rate against every aircraft within its range. One could ex-
pect and asymmetric plot, because the aircraft was flying straight in the positive x direction.
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Figure 4.2: No Alert and No Maneuver JMP 3D Scatterplot
The scatter plot above shows a view of the effectiveness of the SAM based on altitude.
One can see more successful hits against the aircraft heading towards the missile’s initial
location. The heading of the aircraft is the same for all 5000 runs in the positive x direction.
One could expect this, because the initial positions created by the Latin Hypercube greater
than 0 in the x direction gave the aircraft a slightly better chance of avoiding impact, be-
cause it is traveling away from the missile launch site. The data analysis completed in JMP
Pro 14 displays a trend of decreasing effectiveness the greater the distance from the initial
location of the missile.
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Figure 4.3: Non-Impact Distribution of X&Y initial location
The graphic above displays the Gaussian distribution of the non-impact scenarios based
on the the airplanes initial X position and Y position. One can see the greatest chance of
avoiding the surface to air missile is at 70km headed toward the missile’s initial location
and at 35km heading away from the missile’s location. With the lowest chance of avoidance
being in between the 0-20km range.
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Figure 4.4: Impact Distribution of X&Y initial location
The graphic above displays the Gaussian distribution of the impact scenarios based on the
the airplanes initial X position and Y position. One can see the missile starts making impact
at approximately 70km, which also is the missile’s lowest chance of impact.
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Figure 4.5: Time Impact Distribution
The graphic above displays the time until impact for 5000 runs. The number of importance
calculated in JMP 14 pro is the average time until impact, the average time until impact is
47.8s.
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4.3.2 Case Study #2
Table 4.9: Simulation Parameters: Full Alert and Maneuver
Simulation Parameters
n 5000
Altitude Z coordinate of the aircraft
XaircraftInt Generated by LH
YaircraftInt Generated LH
Aircraft Boeing 777-300ER
Missile SA - 2
Maneuver Maneuvers to missile’s bearing
Update Missile location updates
Direction Maneuvers to missile’s bearing
Delay N/A
Alert Time Aircraft is alerted at missile launch
Intensity 1
For the second case study the researcher created a scenario that simulates a wide-body
aircraft equipped with a missile warning system attempting to be shot down by a surface
to air missile. The aircraft is completely aware of the SAM site and is alerted and updated
about the missile’s location. After the aircraft is alerted the aircraft attempted to maneuver.
The simulation parameters are listed above.
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Figure 4.6: Full Alert and Maneuver Matlab Visual Output
In this case study, because the aircraft was aware of the missile launch it was able to make
a maneuver. As one could see from the figure above that there was some improvement on
the x-axis. The aircraft was able to get approximately 20km closer to the initial missile
launch location when compared to case study # 1.
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Figure 4.7: Full Alert and Maneuver JMP 3D Scatterplot
Again, the scatter plot above shows a view of the effectiveness of the SAM based on alti-
tude. The plot above shows more successful hits against the aircraft heading towards the
missile’s initial location. This scatter plot reflects a significant change in the SAMs effec-
tive range when compared to case study #1. Again, one could expect the effectiveness of
the SAM based on altitude would closely resemble a uniform distribution.
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Figure 4.8: Non-Impact Distribution
The graphic above displays the Gaussian distribution of the non-impact scenarios based
on the the airplanes initial X position and Y position. One can see the greatest chance of
avoiding the surface to air missile is at 50km headed toward the missile’s initial location
and at 35km heading away from the missile’s location. With the lowest chance of avoidance
being in between the 0-20km range. Again, reducing the SAM’s effective range to 50km
when headed toward the SAM site.
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Figure 4.9: Impact Distribution
The graphic above displays the Gaussian distribution of the impact scenarios based on the
the airplanes initial X position and Y position. One can see the missile starts making impact
at approximately 50km, which also is the missile’s lowest chance of impact.
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Figure 4.10: Time Impact Distribution
The graphic above displays the time until impact for 5000 runs. The average time until
impact was 69.4s. The average time until impact increased from 47.8s to 69.4s. The time
of survival increased by approximately 20 seconds when compared to case study # 1. One
could use this number as validation, because as you increase the number of operations to
avoid the surface to air threat, the time of survival would increase.
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4.3.3 Case Study #3
Table 4.10: Simulation Parameters: Full Alert, Maneuver, Countermeasure: Chaff
Simulation Parameters
n 5000
Altitude Z coordinate of the aircraft
XaircraftInt Generated by LH
YaircraftInt Generated LH
Aircraft Boeing 777-300ER
Missile SA - 2
Maneuver Maneuvers to missile’s bearing
Update Missile location updates
Direction Maneuvers to missile’s bearing
Delay N/A
Alert Time Aircraft is alerted at missile launch
Countermeasure Chaff
Intensity 1
For the third case study the researcher created a scenario that simulates a wide-body air-
craft equipped with a missile warning system and countermeasure, attempting to be shot
down by a surface to air missile. The aircraft is completely aware of the SAM site and is
alerted and updated about the missile’s location. After the aircraft is alerted the aircraft
attempted to make a maneuver. The simulation parameters are listed above. In this case
study, because the aircraft was aware of the missile launch it was able to make a maneu-
ver and release a countermeasure. The ALE-47 dispenser system comes with an automatic
release setting which one can assume relieves the human in the system of responsibility,
ultimately reducing the human error to zero.
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Figure 4.11: Full Alert, Maneuver, and Countermeasure Matlab Visual Output
In this case study, because the aircraft was aware of the missile launch it was able to make
a maneuver and use a countermeasure. As one could see from the figure above that there
was some improvement on the x-axis, but also in the y axis. The aircraft was able to get
approximately 30km closer to the initial missile launch location when compared to case
study # 2 and 50km closer compared to case study #1.
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Figure 4.12: Full Alert, Maneuver, and Countermeasure JMP 3D Scatterplot
Again, the scatter plot above shows a view of the effectiveness of the SAM based on alti-
tude. The plot above shows more successful hits against the aircraft heading towards the
missile’s initial location. This scatter plot reflects a significant change in the SAMs effec-
tive range when compared to case study #1 & #2. Again, one could expect the effectiveness
of the SAM based on altitude would closely resemble a uniform distribution.
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Figure 4.13: Non-Impact Distribution
The graphic above displays the Gaussian distribution of the non-impact scenarios based
on the the airplanes initial X position and Y position. One can see the greatest chance of
avoiding the surface to air missile is at 20km headed toward the missile’s initial location and
at 15km heading away from the missile’s location. With the lowest chance of avoidance
being in between the 0-5km range. Again, reducing the SAM’s effective range to 20km
when headed toward the SAM site.
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Figure 4.14: Impact Distribution
The graphic above displays the Gaussian distribution of the impact scenarios based on the
the airplanes initial X position and Y position. One can see the missile starts making impact
at approximately 20km, which also is the missile’s lowest chance of impact.
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Figure 4.15: Time until Impact Distribution
The graphic above displays the time until impact for 5000 runs. The average time until
impact was 49.9s. One could expect a decrease in survival time, because the aircraft that
were hit were so much closer to the initial position of the missile. One could compare
the time of survival of the aircraft between the range 0 - 20km to the survival time of the
aircraft not equipped with countermeasures between the same range.
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4.3.4 Validation
There were several steps taken to validate the model created. Expert intuition and real sys-
tem measurements were the guiding principles throughout the development process. When
dealing with systems such as surface to air missiles, there is a lot of information that is
available, but there is also a lot of information not available, causing one to make assump-
tions and perform rough naive calculations. Real system measurements were available for
the aircraft and countermeasure systems individually. However, they were not real system
measurements for the two systems combined. Making the real system measurement ap-
proach invalid. As another form of validation the researcher performed single runs with
specific input parameter values, with foreseeable outcomes.
4.3.5 Benefit Analysis
The researcher has calculated the costs of retrofitting commercial aircraft with countermea-
sure technologies and simulated the countermeasure’s effectiveness at various altitudes, one
can now perform a benefit analysis.
Any decision about government-mandated countermeasures installation aboard commer-
cial airliners should thus consider the overall budget available for homeland security pur-
poses [38]. The FY 2018 Transportation Security Administration budget is $7.6 B [31].
One can assume the government would be responsible, because in a capitalistic society
the state cannot force private industry to bear the cost. These cost estimates encompass
only the period through the year 2028. As time goes on one could assume the technology
available to terrorist groups will improve. The weapons systems of the future will have the
capability of being radar guided and infrared guided, which would entail multiple counter-
measure systems on board commercial airliners for there to be a slight chance of survival.
At that point it may become desirable to increase the countermeasure capability on com-
mercial aircraft. The total cost of installation and O&S is approximately $4.5 B, which
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encompasses about 59% of the current TSA budget. The technologies being considered
only attempt to protect the aircraft against one type of surface to air missile. Another very
important aspect not being considered is the taking off and landing portion of the commer-
cial aircraft’s flight profile. One could make the argument that that is currently the larger
threat to commercial aircraft. The goal of this research was to bridge the gap between the
performance of the countermeasure technology and the cost benefit analysis of the same
technology. One could feel if the countermeasure technology improves the odds of aircraft
survival by even one percent then it could be economically feasible and technically viable.
One could also feel the price tag of integrating these technologies is economically feasible,
because the chances of anyone actually attempting to shoot down an airliner are much less
than one percent. A multilayered approach is important, because no single countermeasure
can defeat all possible SAM attacks with high confidence. Nonetheless, substantial protec-
tion can be achieved by adding a missile warning system and a chaff dispenser system to a
commercial aircraft.
4.4 Summary of Findings
The findings from this thesis include quantifying the effectiveness of the ALE 47 dispenser
system and the AN/AAR 54 missile warning system along with a cost benefit analysis. The
results from the CBA include approximately $1.3 B for installation costs and approximately
$3.2 B for O&S costs through the year of 2028. The combined cost of both is $ 4.5 B, which
is approximately 60% of the current 2018 budget of $7.6 B. The results from the SWAP
analysis conclude adding these technologies to commercial aircraft is technically feasible.
To add six ALE 47 dispenser systems and one MWS it would require approximately 5 cubic
feet of space in the cargo area of the aircraft. The MWS system would use approximately
400 watts, which would cost approximately $500 annually if the system is used 24 hours a
day. The effectiveness of the SAM is extremely high when the aircraft is unaware of SAM
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site. The SAM had an effective range up to 70km for aircraft headed towards the SAM site.
The effectiveness of the SAM decreases when the aircraft is able to maneuver, reducing
the effective range to 50km. Quantifying the effectiveness of the countermeasure resulted
in reducing the effective range of the SAM to 20km. The table and figure below outlines
the effect of taking actions against a surface to air threat and also comparing the benefits of
countermeasures versus maneuvers.
Figure 4.16: Effective range of SAM based on operation
The figure above displays the effective range of the SAM based on the aircraft operation.
The area encompassed by the largest circle, represents when the aircraft is completely un-
aware of the SAM. The second largest area represents when the aircraft is equipped with
the missile warning system and the aircraft is able to perform a maneuver. The smallest
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area represents the effective range of the SAM when the aircraft is equipped with a missile
warning system and countermeasure system.
Table 4.11: Current vs. Maneuver vs. Countermeasure
Current Setup MWS & Maneuver MWS & Maneuver & Countermeasure
Effective SAM range 70km 50 km 20 km
Additional Cost $0 $10’s of thousands $4.5 B
Along with the figure above to compare the differences of the way current commercial
aircraft are equipped, countermeasures, and maneuvers the data was tabulated to compare
the three. In the table above one could the effective range of the SAM for the aircraft headed
toward the SAM site. The cost of the maneuver is based on the literature of training pilots to
perform an optimized maneuver. One could assume that putting the aircraft in autopilot to
perform the maneuver was drastically reduce the error in a high pressure situation. Again,
addressing research question two and substantiating hypothesis two. Case study #1 verifies
the effectiveness of a surface to air threat against a defenseless wide-body aircraft to be
extremely high. The most important contribution this thesis makes is when one compares
case study #2 to case study #3, one can recognize at the current state of the technologies
being considered making a maneuver is a more viable alternative than adding technologies
to commercial aircraft. Unless, one could determine a much smaller fleet size to add these
technologies to, then one could make the argument adding technologies is a more viable
option if one deems the difference in effectiveness to be worth it.
4.4.1 Recommendations
Given the uncertainties of the effectiveness of the countermeasures when equipped to a
commercial airliner and the pilot in a time of extremely high pressure. A decision to install
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these technologies should be postponed for the following reasons. The current chance of
a commercial airliner attempting to be shot down is extremely low, also the effectiveness
of the countermeasure does not reduce the effective range of the SAM to zero, making the
the investment not currently worth it. As soon as there is a countermeasure that would
allow a commercial aircraft to virtually fly over any conflict zone with 100% confidence
and protect the aircraft in all three phase of flight takeoff, cruise, and landing. Then one
can assume it would be worth it to add these technologies to a commercial aircraft. In the
meantime flying around conflict zones will assert itself as the more viable option.
4.4.2 Limitations
The cost benefit analysis does not incorporate the training of ground crews in maintaining
the new countermeasure systems. There are limitations in the simulation specifically in
the missile sensor model. The current missile sensor model always knows the location of
the aircraft. An increased fidelity in the missile sensor model would include radar sensor
error. Incorporating this error would slightly increase the odds of avoiding the surface to air
thereat. To perform an optimized maneuver to avoid a surface to air threat it would require
the training of the pilots who are required to fly aircraft with countermeasure systems,
which would incur some additional cost.
4.4.3 Future Work
Future work for this research consists of increasing the fidelity of the model in the following
places, such as the missile sensor model and the atmospheric physics surrounding the chaff
cloud. Additional future work includes performing trade studies on the countermeasure
effectiveness against different types of threats and countermeasures and also perturbing the




The United States has many airline companies and citizens that fly over millions of square
miles of conflict zones on a daily basis [4], increasing the chances of an attempt to shoot
down a commercial aircraft. As time goes on it is increasingly easier for rebel groups to
acquire surface to air missiles. As a way to decrease the chances of a surface to air threat
making contact with a commercial transport aircraft, there has been some research done
by chow et al. that mentions a multilayered approach on how to mitigate some of this risk
byadding technologies to these aircraft that would accomplish this task.
The objective of this research was to bridge the gap between the cost benefit analysis and
to quantify the effectiveness of the ALE-47 chaff dispenser system integrated along with
the AN/AAR 54(V) missile warning system. Bridging this gap involved answering the fol-
lowing research questions with their hypothesis:
Research Question 1:
How can one quantify the effectiveness of countermeasures deployed from commercial
airliners against surface to air threats to capture the cost benefit relationship for implemen-
tation of such countermeasures?
Hypothesis 1:
If the researcher uses a survivability model to quantify the effectiveness of each counter-
measure and a cost model to provide detailed cost analysis, then one could directly capture
the correlation between cost and survivability between countermeasures.
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Research Question 2:
By quantifying the effects of the countermeasure on a commercial aircraft using a SWAP
analysis one could determine if the cost of implementation from both acquisition cost and
performance decrements are justified. Further, how can one determine if adding counter-
measures to commercial aircraft or simply avoiding conflict zones altogether is more cost
effective over the lifespan of the vehicle?
Hypothesis 2:
If the survivability rate is not high enough to justify the cost of adding these technologies
to a commercial aircraft; then avoiding conflict zones altogether will likely assert itself as
the more viable alternative.
To capture the correlation between cost and effectiveness of the countermeasure technol-
ogy, the researcher performed a cost benefit analysis on all of the technologies that would
make the countermeasure technology most effective. The steps below were taken to per-
form the cost benefit analysis.
1. Define the unit of cost. It is important to establish what exactly your CBA measures
in terms of cost. The two types of cost defined by my research will be time and
money.
2. Itemize the tangible costs of the intended project. The two tangible costs that the
researcher will consider will be installation cost and OS costs.
3. Itemize all intangible costs.
4. Itemize projected benefits, that stem from adding countermeasure systems to com-
mercial aircraft. If there were an unsuccessful SAM attack on a United States com-
mercial aircraft, due to a countermeasure system, the projected benefits are that the
confidence of travelers will increase, money will be saved from the saving of lives
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and the plane, and a possible increase in travelers who feared a SAM attack on a
commercial aircraft.
5. Add up and compare the project’s cost and benefits. All of the installation costs and
OS costs will be added up, and then all of the ongoing costs will be subtracted from
the ongoing benefits determined in step 4.
6. Calculate a payback time for the venture. Unfortunately, for this venture to be worth
it there would have to be an attack on a United States commercial aircraft. On top of
that, it is not guaranteed that the countermeasure system will always work against a
SAM.
7. Use the CBA to make an informed decision about whether to pursue the project.
After analyzing all of the information determined from the CBA, one would use the
information to determine if adding countermeasure systems to commercial aircraft is
technically feasible and financially viable.
Along with the cost benefit analysis the researcher used modeling and simulation to deter-
mine the effectiveness of the countermeasure. Through data analysis the researcher dis-
played the effectiveness of the countermeasure on a wide-body commercial aircraft. The
simulation included motion models for both the aircraft and missile, and a low fidelity
sensor model for the missile. The researcher concluded that cost of retrofitting these to
technologies to the aircraft were not worth it, based on the information provided in the
cost benefit analysis, current budgetary restrictions, and the likelihood of the aircraft being
attacked.
The researcher performed a size, weight, and power analysis on the technologies required
for the countermeasure to be most effective. The SWAP analysis included:
1. Calculated size in comparison to the overall size of the plane
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2. Calculated the forces of the system on the plane
3. Calculated the power needed to supply the system
The researcher concluded that the amount of space, forces, and power required for the
systems was not low enough to be negligible, but was also not high enough enough to im-
pede on any major aircraft operations. The researcher concludes that flying around conflict
zones altogether is a more viable option than adding these technologies to the commercial
wide-body aircraft, because it is technically possible to add these technologies, but is not
economically feasible.
5.0.1 Answers to Research Questions 1 & 2
The answer to research question one was answered in Tasks 1 and 3 by performing both
tasks with enough fidelity one could correlate the cost and effectiveness. Hypothesis one is
substantiated by the results from the detailed cost model and the countermeasure effective-
ness simulation.
The answer to research question two was answered by case study # 3 by quantifying the
effectiveness of the countermeasure, the countermeasure did reduce the SAMs effective
range, but it did not make the SAM ineffective. Allowing the alternative of flying around
conflict zones to assert itself as the more viable option substantiating hypothesis 2.
5.0.2 Things to Consider
There are several things one may consider when developing a detailed cost model. Such as
the amount of planes being considered. It is very possible that the number of aircraft being
considered is too high. One could determine which planes fly over conflict zones by tail
number and only add countermeasure technologies to those aircraft who fly the route. By
greatly decreasing the number of aircraft that need to be retrofitted one could substantially
reduce the cost allowing for more effective countermeasures. Then one could come to the
64
conclusion that adding countermeasure to commercial aircraft is economically viable. One
could also consider adding technologies to a commercial aircraft that covers all three phases
of the flight profile (takeoff, landing, and takeoff). One could look at this as a cause and
effect scenario, an interesting study would be to look into the actual cause of the conflict
zone and determine if that would be a more economically viable alternative.
5.0.3 Research Contributions
The research methodology above provides value on multiple levels with its largest con-
tribution being to the airline industry. Contributions to the academic community would
include providing case studies that would determine the effectiveness of the technologies
being considered. Contributions to ASDL include an in-house tool for determining the suc-
cess rate of countermeasure systems being retrofitted to commercial vehicles, along with
a cost benefit analysis. In addition, a parametric motion model has been developed that is
very customizable to any aircraft or missile. Contributions to the airline industry include






THE SIMULATION (AIRCRAFT & MISSILE MOTION MODEL)
The codes below include the simulation, classes for the the aircraft, missile, vehicle, update
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